


HALL (Ed.)

THE  
RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY  
AND ITS VINDICATIONS.

BY  
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## CONTENTS OF THE JANUARY NUMBER, 1862.

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### I. ESSAYS AND REVIEWS.

ARTICLE I.—THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF EMMONS,	7
II.—THE ANTE-NICENE TRINITARIANISM. By Prof. R. D. Hitchcock, D.D.,	54
III.—MEMORIAL OF THE AMERICAN BOARD. By Dr. Worcester,	82
IV.—THE TWO SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY. By Tayler Lewis, LL.D.,	102
V.—GARDINER SPRING, D.D., AND THE BRICK CHURCH, N. Y.,	135
VI.—THE BEAUTY OF HOLINESS,	142

### II. THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Codex Sinaiticus—Discoveries in Asia Minor—Jewish Literature. GERMANY: Luther's Monument—Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie—Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift—other German theological quarterlies—Döllinger—Biographical Works, etc. HOLLAND: The Four Theological Parties—Scholten, etc. FRANCE: Lacordaire—Migne's Collections— <i>Revue Chrétienne</i> — <i>Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne</i> —New Works—Paris Press. ITALY: Passaglia—New Manuscripts—Mazzini—Nicolini—Michel Angelo, etc. GREECE: Common Schools—Mixed Marriages—Bishops and Bibles. ENGLAND: Journal of Sacred Literature—British and Foreign Evangelical Review—Other Reviews—Wesleyan Literature—New Works, etc. SCOTLAND: Stewart's New System—Douglas of Cavers, etc. UNITED STATES: North American and other Reviews—New Works—Oriental Society—Danville Quarterly,	157
--	-----


### III. LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE: Macdonald's Pentateuch—Lange's Matthew Translated—Trench's Seven Churches in Asia—Ellicott's Life of Christ—Hopkins's Spots on the Sun—The Book of Psalms. THEOLOGY: Keerl, Der Mensch, das Ebenbild Gottes—Réville, <i>Essais de Critique Religieuse</i> —Tracts for Priests and People—Hudson's Debt and Grace—Walker's Sermons—Huntington's Year of Church Work—Butler's Theology—Stewart's Free-Will Baptists—Ball on Baptism. THE CHURCH AND ITS HISTORY: Frederick William IV on Church Government—Dorner's Person of Christ—Chrystal's Baptism—Hagenbach's History of Doctrines—Gieseler's Church History—HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY: Hopkins's Puritans—May's Constitutional History of England—Schmidt's Melancthon—Uhlborn's Urbanus Rhegius—Memoirs of Prof. Bush—Baehring and Gelzer on Bunsen. BOOKS OF TRAVEL: Andersson's Okavango River—Last Travels of Ida Pfeiffer. GENERAL LITERATURE: Marsh on the English Language—Zengler, <i>Bibliotheca Orientalis</i> —Works of Lord Byron—Titcomb's Lessons in Life—Davidson's Elijah—The Partisan Leader—Reade's Cloister and Hearth—Brooks, The Silver Cord—Wills, Notice to Quit—Streaks of Light—Eclectic Magazine—Harper's Magazine. POLITICAL AND CIVIL QUESTIONS: Rice, Our Country, and the Church—Dall, Woman's Rights—Lord on National Currency—Ellison's Slavery in the United States—Addresses and Discourses by Prentiss, Hitchcock, Henry, Walker, Dunning, and Magie,	174
--	-----

### IV. STATISTICS, AND CHURCH NEWS.

Population of the Globe—Cost of War—European Cities—The Evangelical Alliance. UNITED STATES: American Board—Statistics of Presbyterian and German Reformed Churches—Southern Presbyterians—Synod of New York and New Jersey on the War CANADA: Census—Newfoundland—Nova Scotia. ENGLAND: Census—Popular Education—Contributions—Church-Rate Bill—Increase of Bishoprics—Congregationalism. SCOTLAND: Free Church. IRELAND: Census. FRANCE: Public Worship—Education—Protestant Churches. SPAIN: Census—Education. ITALY: St. Peter's Pence—Statistics of Rome—Convents in Perugia. ASIA: Protestantism in Siam,	192
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## THE RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS VINDICATIONS.

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AN article in the last October number of the *Princeton Review*, on Dr. Hickok's revised edition of his *Rational Psychology*, has called forth two responses from Dr. Hickok himself, one from Professor Tayler Lewis, and another, understood to be from a distinguished professor, a friend and former pupil of Dr. Hickok. Of these, the first three were published in the *American Theological Review*, and the last in the *Princeton Review*. Seldom has any system of Psychology been favored, in so short a time, with so many vindications from so formidable an array of defenders. The *Rational Psychology* may well be proud of these, and be well content to rest its cause, if anywhere, upon these defences. Its author informs us, that "It is given in this revised form, from the conviction that its use is still needed"—"especially as a text or reference book in the higher philosophical instruction in our colleges." It is from posts of eminence in important colleges that its vindications come. Other indications also show, that it has already established its own school in philosophy, and is rapidly and widely doing its work in forming the intellectual principles and habits of the rising generation of scholars. These considerations, as well as the intrinsic importance of the questions and principles at issue, are sufficient to stand as an apology for some further examination both of the *Psychology* and of its vindications, which examination it is now proposed to make, so far as the brief limits assigned us here

will permit. For a better understanding of the case, let us first notice the state of the question.

The doctrine of perception might seem, at first view, a matter of small moment; yet on this depends the possibility of all philosophy, and of all assured knowledge, whether there is a real world, or whether all things exist to us only in idea. Dr. Hickok has therefore well stated it as the great problem in philosophy: "The problem which philosophy has felt herself called upon to solve, is this: How may the intellect know that which is out of, and at a distance from itself?"

The doctrine of Natural Realism, advocated by Reid, and more fully developed by Hamilton, assumes that our faculties of cognition, in their normal state and action, are true. Or rather, in the view of its advocates, it assumes nothing, but only recognises the fact given in consciousness, that we immediately behold—are presented face to face with—the object of the cognitive faculty, and so not only know the object immediately, but *know the knowing*—are conscious of beholding it in direct intuition. This they regard as the highest certainty. Doubt this, and we know nothing. There is nothing that we may not, on the same grounds, call into equal question. Proof is impossible; not because the intuitive beholding is doubtful, but because there is nothing more certain, by which proof might be possible. The proof of the proof would need proving, and then the proof of the proof of the proof, and so on forever. Proving the intuitions of one faculty by those of another faculty equally human, involves the same infinite series of absurdities as before. One, therefore, who begins by doubting an intuition, whether an axiom of reason, or a direct cognition by another faculty, must either doubt universally and doubt forever, or continue to give proof of proof, with no possibility of reaching anything ultimate or certain, and no possibility of ceasing this endless labor, unless he shall at last find refuge in some transcendental world, created by the "antagonisms and diremptions" of absurdities and self-contradictions.

The advocates of Natural Realism maintain, of course, that we are carefully to limit the witness of each faculty to its own



objects. Sense can give nothing save objects of sense. It is reason that rises to causes and necessary principles and truths, and that discerns in objects of sense more than sense reveals, and more than can be yielded by any mere analysis of the objects of sense. Nor is it every sense that gives immediate intuition of an outward object. The hearing, for example, is limited to the sensation. No advocate of Natural Realism pretends that hearing alone could give knowledge of a bell. The Natural Realist holds that in the sense of touch, or rather in the muscular sense of resistance commonly included in touch, we are presented face to face with outward objects having extension and solidity. These qualities are immediately perceived; and, says Sir Wm. Hamilton, they "really exist in the objects, as they are ideally presented to our minds". These are called Primary Qualities; without them no material object can have existence. There are other qualities, not supposed necessary to the existence of material bodies, and which belong to them occasionally. They have power to give us sensations, while the quality itself is not perceived, but is to us simply an unknown cause of the sensation. For sufficient reasons we *judge* these causes to be qualities in the object. Such are the qualities which give us the sensations of heat, taste, smell and hearing. These are called Secondary Qualities.

This distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and between an immediate *perception* of an object and a *judgment* of its existence, is wholly ignored by many others, who hold that in all perception nothing is directly given save our own sensations. To them all qualities are but such as Natural Realists regard the secondary. In their view, if in hearing we do not have immediate perception of a "bell", then in no sense have we an immediate knowledge of anything outward. Thus, Professor Tayler Lewis argues at length, from the fact that we hear the *sound*, and do not immediately perceive the *bell* in the hearing, that no outward object whatever is ever perceived; and—what more surprises us—he argues as though he really supposed that those of a differ-

ent philosophy maintain that we perceive the bell by hearing alone!

As an immediate cognition or intuition is incapable of proof, so also it is to us incapable of explanation. It is to us an ultimate fact; there is nothing more direct or simple, by which explanation might be possible; and we are too ignorant to attempt to tell either how the sensation, or how knowledge through the sensation, is ever accomplished. We cannot give an "Idea" of any Intelligence, much less of "All Intelligence."

Another point demands attention here, viz., the distinction "between the *being* and the *becoming*". Suppose it granted that we do immediately perceive some outward phenomenon: Dr. Hickok still meets with two difficulties in the way of perceiving any real thing. The real amount of these difficulties is, first, that we cannot *perceive* a real thing; and, secondly, that there *is* no real thing having permanent being, and that there can be none. Thus (*American Theological Review*, April, p. 204), Dr. Hickok says:

"The phenomena of sense"—"are constantly coming and departing." "The color or the sound of one instant is not that of the next." "To such as contemplate nothing but the phenomenal, it must appear that '*all things flow*.'" "The instant of the coming in sense, is also the instant of evanishing; and we cannot say at any time it *is*, but only it is *coming* into manifestation." "Hence we know the phenomenal only as the *becoming*."

That is, suppose a real thing, as a horse—we cannot *perceive* him as a real horse; we can never say that it is, but only that it is *coming* into manifestation. No horse is *manifested*, but only a phenomenon in a "flow". There is no permanent phenomenon for us to perceive.

But, secondly, we cannot suppose a real thing. There can be no real permanent thing. Thus (*American Theological Review*, July, p. 404), Dr. Hickok says: "The Psychology supposes universal nature to be the perpetual product of the Creator's continued agency"; i. e. matter is force, constantly coming into being while the Creator keeps his spiritual acts



in counter-agency. When counter-agency ceases, as there is nothing else in matter, matter ceases to be. Suppose, then, that all our faculties combine, to give us, for the moment, cognition of an objective and supposed real horse. The object itself is in as much a "flow" as the sensations. All the horse there is, is "constantly coming and departing". We may say of it, as of the sensations: "The instant of its arising in sense, is also the instant of its evanishing, and we cannot say at any time it *is*, but only it is *coming*." Horses are constantly *about to be*, but they never *are*. There are therefore no real horses for us to perceive. Here is the famous distinction between "the *being* and the *becoming*", of which Dr. Hickok declares his reviewer to be so profoundly ignorant, as not to have "taken the first step in that long path which philosophy has for so many ages been travelling". So clear is it to Professor Tayler Lewis, that things cannot have any being, that (*American Theological Review*, January, p. 110) he quotes Scripture to prove that objects of sense are—not merely transitory and changing—but that they have no *being*, while all things that are real are "above the world of sense for evermore". Where, then, did he find his Bible? If he believes it as he interprets it, then he believes there is no Bible.

The question of a knowledge of outward things should seem to be here forever decided and foreclosed: we can *perceive* no such things. Such things neither *are* nor *can be*. We come to the end of the path which philosophy has for so many ages been travelling, and soon we expect Professor Lewis and Dr. Hickok, for we have left them on the road.

The Natural Realist is not troubled with difficulties like these. If his senses give to him, for the moment, an outward horse, he will take him and use him, not questioning whether it be a horse in a "flow", created anew and different every moment, nor whether—supposing a real horse—sense never presents him as a horse in *being*, but only as "*becoming*" a horse—a horse *about to be*. If all this be so, he, a flowing man, will use the flowing horse for the flowing moment—the horse for the moment created in a flowing creation. Such as

he is for the moment, he is sure he, for the moment, perceives him. Questions about the being and the becoming pertain not to perception, nor to the knowledge of what *is* for the present; let those who meet them solve them.

But, suppose one urges that our faculties may deceive us? If they do this in their normal state and action, then they may deceive us in the proving, and we can know nothing. If such a man is sincere, nothing can help him. If he doubts through mere superfluity of naughtiness, then we can bring nothing more certain; he is joined to his idols; let him alone.

But, suppose one gives to this general doubt of all our faculties a specific form? Suppose he affirms that the inevitable witness of consciousness in all men is, that we perceive outward things immediately, while the reason demonstrates that all such immediate perception is impossible, and that this contradiction in the very sources of knowledge destroys all possibility of knowledge?

We will not argue with him on this basis; it assumes the futility of all argument. We deny the alleged facts assumed as the premises. It is indeed true that "all minds are shut up to the testimony of consciousness for a direct and immediate perception of the outward object"; but it is not true that reason has ever demonstrated the contrary. This position is so important to the very possibility of all philosophy, that we ask to be heard upon it for a few moments. We affirm then,

First, that *Reason is incapable of any such demonstration*. Reason cannot, in the last analysis of sense, show any contact between matter and mind, nor comprehend how such contact is possible; nor, if it were possible, how such contact should give knowledge. As little can she explain how knowledge may be given without contact. She is wholly unable to explain or comprehend the manner, or the idea, of any actual knowledge by any one, or by all of our senses. She is as much lost in trying to explain how there can be a sensation, as in trying to explain how sense can give knowledge of out-



ward things. Reason, then, is wholly incompetent to make any demonstration in the case, or to give any "Idea" of any "Intelligence," and cannot rationally make the denial attributed to her. With a little more light she might see, that what she is assumed to deny as impossible is beautifully and most rationally true.

Indeed, reason would have been quite as likely, *à priori*, to deny the possibility of sensation. For, does not sensation involve either contact, or union, or intercommunication between mind and matter, such as constitutes the very difficulty supposed to be in the way of coming to a knowledge of outward things? What philosopher could have told, *à priori*, that matter and mind—separated, as the philosophers say, by "the whole diameter of being"—could ever come together to form the creature man, or to give to any being such a faculty as *sense*, in which mind and matter must in some way combine? The supposed impossibility of such contact, or combination, or intercommunication, in perception, led to the Platonic invention of a *Plastic Medium*, to the notion of Malebranche, that, as sense can give us nothing, we "*see all things in God*", and to the notion of Leibnitz, that, as mind and matter can have no intercommunication, God has ordained a *preëstablished harmony*, in which, with no mutual influence upon each other, mind and matter act in concert. Reason could comprehend nothing and explain nothing. Yet, those were attempts rationally to explain, and, like Dr. Hickok, to give "subjective Ideas of Intelligence". The attempts ended only in absurdity. Reason, then, has never made the demonstration attributed to her. She is incapable of such demonstration. The very attempt is irrational, as it ever must be irrational to attempt to give an *à priori* Idea of All Intelligence. The testimony of consciousness, therefore, is wholly unimpaired. There is no such contradiction in the sources of our knowledge as has been supposed.

But in the second place, *all schemes based on the supposed truth of the alleged demonstration have hitherto ended most logically in Idealism or Pantheism; and so have practically*

*reduced the alleged demonstration to absurdity.* The course of reasoning which led to such results will show that all other schemes, based on the same principles, must come at last to the same end.

Berkeley began with assuming, that in perception we are conscious only of our own sensations. He ended—most logically—with concluding that there is, to us, no world save our own ideas.

Kant *assumed* the existence of something outward, but held that the apparent form and qualities are determined, not by the outward thing, but by our faculties, so that in perception, things conform to our cognitions, not our cognitions to things. He concluded, therefore, that the province of philosophy is not to study outward facts, but *à priori*, our powers of knowing. “The new method of thought which we have adopted”, said he, “*is based on the principle that we only cognize in things, à priori, that which we ourselves place in them*”. (*Meiklejohn's Trans.* p. xxix.)

True, said Fichte; but if our minds posit the form and quality, why not the substance also? All is sufficiently accounted for, by regarding all as mental positings. Our minds create all the worlds, we know; and God, also, is but an idea which man creates.

Even our own Edwards, in his very youth, before Berkeley's speculations were given to the world, and before Kant was born, assuming the same principle, came to a similar conclusion. “*Consciousness*”, said he, “*is the mind's perceiving what is in itself*”. A harmless and very reasonable position, one might have thought. But, mark the logical consequences wrapped up in that seemingly harmless sentence! For Edwards proceeded with the power of a modern locomotive, and kept the track: thus, “Body and solidity” are, to our perception, “the same”. The perception of a supposed outward solidity is only the consciousness of a sensation of resistance; since we are conscious only of our own sensations. There is no need of supposing anything outward, whether substance or quality. All you can know is, that you are conscious of a sensation.



"The reason", said he, "why it is so exceedingly natural to man to suppose that there is some *latent substance* that upholds the properties of bodies is, because all men see that the properties of bodies are such as need some cause". "All, therefore, agree that there is *something* that is there, and upholds these properties. And it is most true there undoubtedly is; but men are wont to content themselves in saying that it is *something*, but that something is He by whom all things consist." (*Appendix*, vol. i, p. 676. Carvill's Ed.) Again, "Resistance, or solidity, is by the immediate exercise of the Divine power; it follows that that which philosophers used to think a certain *unknown substratum*, which stood beneath and kept up solidity, is nothing at all distinct from solidity itself; or that, if they must needs apply that word to something else, that does really and properly subsist by itself, and support properties, they must apply it to the Divine Being or power itself"—"so that, speaking most strictly, *there is no proper substance but God himself*". (*Ibid.* p. 713.)

Perhaps Edwards derived these notions from Sir Isaac Newton, who, assuming that we are conscious only of our own sensations, supposed that what we regard as matter and an outward world, may be fully accounted for, and a rough idea of creation be attained, without the necessity of supposing any such thing as matter. He supposed that God, by his power, renders a certain portion of infinite space impenetrable to another portion of space rendered likewise impenetrable; both spaces continuing absolutely void as before. From these he supposes that motion and the other properties and accidents ascribed to matter may be educed. (In *Wight's Hamilton*, p. 303.)

A moment's reflection shows that the supposed impenetrable space is quite as unnecessary, on the assumed principle of perception, as either real qualities or real substances. For, as we are conscious only of sensations, why may not sensations be given as well without the impenetrable space? Or why may not the sensation, as well as the space, or quality, or substance, be a mere idea? Edwards was too acute not to see this.

"But now it is easy to conceive of resistance as a mode of an idea." "How is there any resistance except it be in some mind?" "The world is therefore an ideal one." "The material universe exists nowhere but in mind." "*Place* itself is mental, and *within* and *without* are mere mental

conceptions. The material universe is absolutely dependent on the conception of the mind for its existence" (pp. 670-1).

And even this ideal universe, Edwards concluded, has no *being*, but is only *becoming*, just as long as God continues to raise these conceptions in created minds. As the world is *thought*, and not *matter*, and as the Divine thoughts are eternal, Edwards held that the world, as to God, was eternal, since "things as to God exist from eternity alike" (p. 671). As to man, Edwards held that the world was created, creation consisting simply in raising up "such ideas in created minds".

It occurs to us to inquire, How, then, could the earth have been created before man?

If we may be allowed a moment's digression, we may suggest a possible solution of the difficulty. Dr. Hickok has shown (*Cosmology*, p. 85), that "Reason is not a *fact*, a thing that has been *made*, but from its own necessity of being, can be conceived no otherwise than a *verity which fills immensity and eternity*". Professor Lewis shows that the human reason, "though physically, sentiently, individually, born in time, *shares in the universal reason*, and breathes the higher life of the uncreated world"; that it brings with it "*à priori* knowledge", "ideas", and "thoughts" that "come with it from its preternatural and *præexistent* sphere", and that "lie in the soul ready for use",—"divine ideas"—in a "divine faculty". (*American Theological Review*, pp. 120, 121.) Now we have seen that Professor Lewis holds that objects of sense have no being, while all things that are real are "above the world of sense for evermore". As sense cannot, therefore, perceive force, may not Professor Lewis well have brought with him, from his "*præexistent sphere*" all the world he ever knew? And, as Dr. Hickok holds (*American Theological Review*, July, p. 440), with regard to all rational ideas, that "the idea in God and man is the same, and is in truth only the Divine idea", why may not Professor Lewis have brought with him that identical eternal world supposed by Edwards?

But to return. So ended in the hands of Edwards, and under his relentless logic, the demonstration of reason, that



in perception we are conscious only of our own sensations. Newton, and Berkeley, and Edwards, and Kant, and Fichte—all assuming the same principle, were swept alike by the same resistless tide of inevitable logic, to the shores either of absolute Idealism or of dreary Pantheism. Can the premises ever yield any other results?

And now Dr. Hickok assumes the same principle. His own latest account of the view taken of this matter in his *Rational Psychology* is, that “*The phenomena of the sense are all thoroughly subjective*”, that “*the perceiving is not a fantasy or delusion, but a genuine sensation*”, and that “*what the affection has come from, the clearest perception must leave in doubt*”. (*American Theological Review*, July, p. 411.) We shall see that in Dr. Hickok’s hands also this principle still yields its necessary results of Idealism or Pantheism.

He adds another difficulty, viz., such a contradiction between reason and consciousness, with regard to perceiving outward things directly, as gives to the skeptic a “*logical right* to doubt whether permanent mind or matter exists”. (*Psychology*, p. 45.) In the *American Theological Review* of April, he maintains that all modern philosophy, even that of our Common Theology, is itself Atheistic or Pantheistic, and that his *Rational Psychology* constitutes “the very defences and support” of the Christian Creed, and that, without the principles of that *Psychology*, our adoption of that creed “can be nothing but an *unreasoning credulity*”. The removal of these grounds of doubt he declares to be “*hopeless* in any other than through an *à priori* method of investigation”. (*Rational Psychology*, p. 45.)

Beginning just here on the basis of absolute ignorance and doubt, receiving nothing from experience, neither knowing nor assuming the possibility of experience, or the existence of facts, or the existence or possibility of reason itself, Dr. Hickok proposes to build up an *à priori* science of mind, and so to solve the problem of a knowledge of outward things.

*What ground has he to stand on? What instruments has he to build with? What means of verifying the truthfulness of*

*his speculations?* He stands on nothing. He supposes the certainty of nothing. Everything and every faculty is called in question. He will prove everything, and assume nothing. He must therefore sustain his proof by putting another proof under it, and, in like manner, sustain the proof of the proof; after the manner of the honest Hibernian, who said, that in his country they began to build chimneys at the top; and when inquired of how they made the top brick keep its place, he answered: "Ah! as for that matter, they put another brick under it." The instruments of building are the unknown and perhaps impossible reason, whose speculations are "void conceptions" until verified by *facts* found in the use of a worse than dubious consciousness—his other instrument. The reason shall tell *à priori* how things *must* be; consciousness shall tell how they *are*. If these agree, the Rational Psychology demands that we receive their conclusion as *science*, the end of doubt, the "Subjective Idea, and the Objective Law of All Intelligence". The rational axiom here assumed is, that when two dubious witnesses agree, one of them a demonstrated falsifier, and the other of doubtful veracity, and even of doubtful existence—their agreement can result in nothing but certainty.

But now Dr. Hickok (*American Theological Review* of July) affirms that the alleged contradiction between reason and consciousness pertains not to him, nor to the *Psychology*, but "belongs solely to the skeptic". This affirmation we shall presently examine. For our present purpose it is sufficient that he regards the contradiction so far valid, as to give the skeptic a "*logical right*" to doubt whether mind or matter exists. This being so, it is of no consequence to whom the declaration of the ground of doubt originally belonged. Dr. Hickok having accepted the premises, must take the necessary conclusions.

Dr. Hickok now says further, that his reviewer "deems that until realities are found, they neither act nor are". Oh! no: the reviewer did not deem that until realities are found by the processes of the *Rational Psychology*, they neither act nor are;



but the *Psychology* itself doubting their reality, and in search of them, must not be allowed to assume their existence before it finds them.

Dr. Hickok now avers further, that while the *Psychology* seeks after the reason as yet unknown and perhaps impossible, "it does not suppose reason not to be, and not to be active in search of itself". He insists that it is only a philosophic and logical finding that he is in search of. Very well; the reviewer then very properly inquired whether he had logically found it. But Dr. Hickok's logical finding required an actual finding. In the *Rational Psychology* itself he most fully affirms it on page 462, in these words: "But thus far the all-comprehending reason is only a void conception. So it *may* be, so, if at all, it *must* be; but that so it *is*, we have yet to find". He then proposes to take "facts", and find it. But *now*, admitting a "logical right to doubt" whether mind or matter exists, and that at the present stage of the argument we know not that reason is, or can be, he demands that the skeptic shall allow him to assume that reason is, "and is active in search of itself"! If this may be assumed, why search any longer? May not the skeptic very properly reply, My good friend, what are you, your book, and your argument, save matter and mind, whose existence you maintain my logical right to doubt? Many such things have I seemed to see and hear and consider; and among them a seeming Plato, and Edwards, and Shakspeare; still you admit my logical right to doubt. What can you bring me more? After all, I know not that I have seen, or heard, or considered anything. When I have considered your rational argument, I know not whether it is rational, or whether there is, or can be, any reason. On your own grounds, I find myself compelled to adopt the beautiful language of Fichte: "All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of a dream itself".

Dr. Hickok, however, proceeds. And now behold the method of the *Rational Psychology*.

The unfound and perhaps impossible reason tells *à priori* all that sense and understanding can be made to do toward attaining a knowledge of outward things. So they *must* be, and so they must operate if at all. Reason sees by an "unmade and eternal principle" that "conditions all power", and that itself is "conditioned by no power"; that the Creator cannot make them at all, if not after this idea. And now consciousness, whose falsity has been demonstrated, is to verify these ideas by *facts*; and that while the very question is whether we can know any facts. Reason now comes in again and gives "Ontological Demonstrations" of the "valid being" both of the "Phenomenal" and the "Notional"; for though no man ever *perceived* "a rose", understanding has a *notion* that separate qualities given in consciousness, are "connected" together in a real outward rose; and this notion is to be verified by an Ontological Demonstration. This done, sense and understanding are now complete.

So far these ideas and demonstrations have been given by the unfound and perhaps impossible reason. Until reason is verified, they all go for nothing. Now comes the harder task of the reason to find and demonstrate herself. She must tell *à priori* what she must be, and what she must do, if ever found; and then this idea must be verified by facts. To this must be added the appropriate Ontological Demonstration of reason and its objects; and our Rational Psychology is complete. Behold the method!

Before we proceed to the details, we must notice more particularly Dr. Hickok's allegation of "mistake and perversion" in the reviewer, to which we have already alluded. In the *American Theological Review*, July, 1862, he says of the alleged contradiction between consciousness and reason:

"These declarations, and all others in connection with them, are the skeptic's mode of argumentation, and for the truth and validity of which, the author is not otherwise responsible than that they should give a fair representation of the skeptical process. They are not his method, his 'argument, nor his conclusions'. But the reviewer assumes them to be the veritable logic of the author of the *Psychology*, and in various ways refutes



and turns to absurdity and ridicule the processes of the *Psychology* itself, by making it responsible for what belongs solely to another."

We have already noticed that it is of no consequence to whom the declarations in question originally belonged. The *Psychology* admits them to be so far valid as to give the skeptic a "logical right" to doubt whether mind or matter exists. They therefore do not "belong solely to another". But the *Psychology*, instead of giving them as belonging solely to another, on the contrary, affirms them originally, and in its own behalf, makes them its argument, and at last, while by an explanation of terms it supposes it removes the contradiction, it sustains both the alleged witness of consciousness and the demonstration of reason; and so is fully responsible to whatever "refutation" or reduction to absurdity or ridicule has followed from its being held to this responsibility.

The facts are these. The *Psychology*, after arguing some time against a particular theory of perception, adduces thus another *argument* — *its own* — *in its own behalf*, and merely brings in the *admission* of the skeptic to confirm its own declarations:

"But a more incorrigible skepticism results from this theory, when comprehensively examined and intrepidly prosecuted to its legitimate conclusions. It is the testimony in the convictions of universal consciousness, that we perceive the external objects themselves. Every man is convinced that it is the outer object, and not some representative of it which he perceives. The knowledge that the object is out of myself, and other than myself, and thus a reality, and not subjective merely, is the testimony of common-sense everywhere. All minds, that of philosophers as well as common people, are shut up to the testimony of consciousness for a direct and immediate perception of the outward object. *The skeptic himself admits*, yea, insists upon this, and founds upon it the necessary conclusions of his skepticism."

Then follows the alleged demonstration of reason to the contrary, which the *Psychology* also urges in its own behalf, and makes it its argument. The whole is repeated in a form, if possible, still stronger on page 381.

Dr. Hickok, however, sees at length that "there must be

some false element somewhere in this alleged conclusion of inevitable contradictions", and supposes that he furnishes data by which "we may detect the fallacy" (p. 382.) He maintains the formula of contradiction entire, and resolves "the whole basis of the skepticism" into "the old sophism of *figura dictionis*" a "false play upon the phraseology". The witness of consciousness is maintained, and the skeptic justified in using it; but the "outward object", to which consciousness testifies, is declared to be the *quality* of the outward thing, and not the "thing itself". The demonstration of reason is fully maintained, but it is interpreted as denying the perception of the *thing itself*, and not of its *quality*. "The *object for the sense* in perception is phenomenon as quality solely; the *object for the reason* is the thing itself as causality for the qualities." With this explanation of the terms, Dr. Hickok makes the declarations of consciousness and reason the *conclusions* of his psychological investigations, and professes to find "exact harmony". So far from repudiating the declarations in question as belonging "solely to the skeptic", he expressly justifies the skeptic, by name, in his use of the alleged testimony of consciousness, thus (p. 382):

"So far our psychological conclusions confirm the *first* fact assumed by the skeptic as his preparation of the ground for his deduction of universal Pyrrhonism, namely, that the universal conviction of consciousness is, that we perceive the object immediately." "But the fact further is, that this distinct and definite *quality* is all that sense can reach, and all that consciousness can testify to as immediate in its own light" (p. 382).

Consciousness and the skeptic then are both sustained in the first declaration. Dr. Hickok also sustains the demonstration of reason. But is not this *quality* itself as much an *outward* object as the *thing* which is causality for the quality? The testimony of consciousness was for "an immediate perception of an *outward* object" — an "object *out of myself*, and *not subjective merely*". The demonstration of reason was, that the mind can be conscious of nothing without, but *only of its own sensations*. "It is not possible to affirm beyond the immediateness of the organic *sensation*"; "*all that can*



*directly be known is, that the mind has such sensations*" (p. 42). Dr. Hickok does not attempt to impugn the demonstration of reason, or the witness of consciousness, but, with his explanation of the terms, sustains both by his psychological conclusions. Where, then, is the "exact harmony"? On his assumed principle that the mind can be conscious only of what is in itself, there can be no harmony. Even with his explanations, the same contradiction remains; and, in his scheme, must remain, unless an outward quality of a material thing can be at the same time a mere sensation. And this we find, on examination, to be the process of educing "exact harmony". It consists simply in Dr. Hickok's deceiving himself by the substitution of a purely mental object for an object wholly outward, and not mental at all; thus (p. 196): "The sense *perceives*, and perception is the apprehension of the phenomenal only. Internal phenomena as mental exercises, and external phenomena as material qualities, are apprehended". Here *external* qualities and phenomena are distinguished from *internal*, and made objects of immediate perception. But *external* qualities are qualities pertaining to external things. They are in the same place called "*material* qualities", meaning, qualities of matter, not mere mental affections (see p. 383). "*The qualities of the rose, color, fragrance, smoothness, weight, taste, etc., as given in any and all organs of sense, are immediately perceived.*" But these, surely, must be something outward, unless we are to talk of colored, fragrant, or heavy sensations.

But on turning to the *à priori* "*Elements of all possible anticipation in the sense*", and reading for eighty-two pages, to the completion of the "*Ontological Demonstration of the valid being of the phenomenal*", we find nothing given in sense, save sensations, which are made the subjects of mere intellectual operations. "The intellectual agency"—"has first to be supplied with a sensation"—"which must be induced by some *content*"—"and the apprehending of this involves a discriminating it from *non-sensation*". "The distinction here is between *content* and a *void*, *sensation* and *non-sensation*". [And surely this must be all; a *material quality* cannot be

transported from the outside thing, and made to take up its abode in the mind — in a sensation — without making both mind and sensation material. A “content” is simply “sensation” distinguished from “non-sensation”. We wish this to be borne in mind as Dr. Hickok’s own account of the matter here.] “This is the first element in the operation of distinction, namely, *Reality*.” Yes, distinguishing a real sensation from non-sensation. “That it is a real *appearance* is determined from non-appearance.” Yes, the real appearance of a sensation. Dr. Hickok argues at length that it is a “*peculiar appearance—more than what it is not*”, and has in it that which is in no other reality” (p. 124), and that when the “intellectual work” of “observation” is performed, “the completed result as precise appearance in consciousness is *Quality*”. “All *sensation*, as distinguished in a complete observation, *becomes quality*, and may be of different kinds, as colors, weight, sounds, etc.”

A marvellous transformation truly! that as by a mere mental process we distinguish and observe a sensation, the *sensation* — “*becomes—quality*”! quality of an outer material thing. What mystic muttering of robed priest; what *Hocus Pocus* of conjurer ever wrought a more marvellous transformation! But Dr. Hickok continues: “*All quality is educed from sensation*, the sensation being taken up by the intellectual agency, and in its distinguishing operation found thereby to be a *reality*, particularized from all others, and peculiar in its phenomenal being”.

A material quality *educed* by a mental operation from a mere sensation! Was the extraction of sunbeams from cucumbers half so wonderful! But Dr. Hickok repeats it again and again. “Heat and cold, sweet and bitter, fragrant and fetid smells”, are by sense perceived as phenomenal “within our subjective sphere”, and so are “outer qualities” — “perceived objects” — “pertaining to a world of reality” [meaning a real outer world], p. 202. Can it be possible! Not unless the sensation is itself the outer “fetid smell” which causes the sensation, making subject and object identical.

These are not casual inadvertences, but the deliberate and



constant processes of the work. On page 382 Dr. Hickok gives a summary of his doctrine of perception, which he has before spread out over so many pages. If any one will turn to that summary—which we are not allowed space enough to give—he will find that nothing is given or reached in that doctrine of perception, save sensations and intellectual operations upon them. Yet out of these is made to come the perception of outward objects!

It ought to be noticed, however, that while, in the *Rational Psychology*, a “content” in the sense is simply a “sensation” as distinguished from a “non-sensation” (p. 122), the *Empirical Psychology* of Dr. Hickok makes it something far different. If we ask the *Empirical Psychology*, What is a *content* in the sense? it answers thus (p. 83):

“A ray of light has gone into the eye; that ray is no longer a ray of light, and that eye is no longer an empty organ. So with the undulation that has gone into the ear; it is a wave of air no more, and it is an empty ear no longer. The *mutual modification* has become a *third somewhat*”, —and this is—“a *content in the sense*: it is not matter, it is not object, it is not anything as yet perceived.”

A *content* in the sense is, therefore, “a *third somewhat*”, a *mutual modification*”, as of a ray of light and eye, or wave of air and ear!

What then is a sensation? The *Empirical Psychology* gives the answer thus (p. 84): “The identification of the reciprocal modifications of both the recipient organ and of that which has been received, is precisely what is meant by sensation”. A precise definition! A “*sensation*” is an “*identification of reciprocal modifications*”, as of ray of light and eye, or of wave of air and ear.

But what is the Identification of reciprocal Modifications? Dr. Hickok does not tell us. But he does tell us (*Empirical Psychology*, p. 87), that “sensation” may be “in a blind and unconscious state”. An unconscious sensation! An unconscious Identification of reciprocal Modifications! And this in an *Empirical Psychology*, which is nothing else than “the science of mind from *consciousness*”! How are these uncon-

scious sensations consciously given? and given as "Facts of mind", as they here purport to be?

But admitting the whole of this explanation, even then, unless a ray of light, or a wave of air, is a quality of the outward object perceived by the eye or ear, or unless the eye or the ear is itself a quality of the outward object perceived by it, then no element of a quality of the things perceived has entered into this Modification whose Identification "is precisely what is meant by sensation". On his own principles—in both *Psychologies*—Dr. Hickok can never know an outward world, save one which he himself creates, by mental Identifications of Modifications which have no element of a material quality in them at all. If it be otherwise, then, by the transferring of real material qualities to the mind, so that they can be distinguished as "reality", every man who perceives a block is mentally transformed into a block,—and, by turns, becomes himself every animal and every material thing which he ever perceives. One should therefore be careful what he sees or handles.

What now is Dr. Hickok's "Demonstration against Universal Pyrrhonism", by which "we are able to utterly overthrow universal skepticism, being made competent through the conclusions of *Rational Psychology*" (p. 384)? It is simply the transcendental reason confounding internal sensations with "material qualities" of external things; and contradicting herself as she before contradicted the necessary convictions of universal consciousness.

Nor is this impotence of sense to reach an outer world at all relieved by the account which the *Psychology* gives of the faculty of Understanding: "The Understanding is faculty for connecting, not for intuitively beholding". "*It must be the connection of such phenomena only as are given in the sense.*" "*It connects only what is first given in the sense*" (p. 221).

Well, what is given in the sense? Sensations only, according to the *Psychology*. The operations upon these are purely mental. Nothing is reached save mental objects mentally connected. The understanding connects them in a mental "notion". The mind *judges* that there must be something



without; then draws an image of that outward something, and judges that its image resembles the object. But, to say nothing of the validity of the other judgments, it is manifest that a judgment of resemblance cannot be formed without first knowing the object resembled. That is, on the plan of the *Psychology*, we can never know an outward object, unless we know it before we know it. The *Psychology*, therefore, instead of giving the "Idea of All Intelligence", gives an Idea on which all knowledge is impossible.

Dr. Hickok complains that his reviewer, by emphasizing "The Idea of *all* Intelligence", "assumes that the *Psychology* undertakes to explain all that mind can do", and that by this "the *Psychology* comes to be very irreverently and ludicrously presumptuous".

Oh! no; not "all that mind can do", but all that mind can possibly be made to do towards an immediate perception of outward things. And surely this is very presumptuous; whether ludicrously so, we do not undertake to say. For before one can tell this, *à priori*, he must know all possible qualities of matter, all possible senses, and all that any sense can be made to do towards giving a knowledge of outward things. He must know whether such knowledge requires contact; and if so, how contact can be between mind and matter, and how contact gives knowledge; or if no contact, then he must know how knowledge can be given without contact, and all possible modes by which intercommunication can be made between matter and mind. Unless his knowledge of these things is so perfect—comprehending what mind is, and all possible ways in which it may acquire knowledge through sense—in fine, unless this *à priori* knowledge is so complete that the Creator cannot devise a way to the transcendental reason unknown—then a Rational Psychology is, by its own conditions, impossible.

Moreover, Dr. Hickok's Idea of perception involves mental processes of distinguishing, defining, and judging. Such processes involve the necessity of *memory* to hold sensations and processes until the result comes out in judgments. The *Rational Psychology* is therefore under the necessity of telling,

*à priori*, whether, and how, minds may be made to remember anything; and of proving the validity of memory and of its objects. In fine, how much short of "explaining all that mind can do" does the *Psychology* "undertake"? Dr. Hickok himself says (p. 26): "*Rational Psychology*"—"gives the *Mind*, through all its functions of intellectual agency, in the conditioning laws which control all its operations". And now he complains that he is held bound to explain how sensations can take place, and how they give knowledge, and whether and how minds may remember! just as though these were not "functions of intellectual agency"!

But Dr. Hickok now says (*American Theological Review*, p. 395), that the assumption of organs of sense, and of sensations [why are these assumed?] and then of the "operations of *distinction* and *limitation*"—"is all the *Psychology* needs or proposes", in showing whatever is "conditional for all perception". "So far and no further can distinct and definite perception be attained."

Was this all? To distinguish and limit sensations without undertaking to tell how an outward object is thereby perceived? Then the *Psychology* did not "need or propose" to do the very thing for which it was undertaken; and it has, moreover, settled the matter, that the Lord cannot make a mind that shall be able to do anything more towards perceiving an outward object, than to distinguish and limit its own sensations.

Moreover, if it had been all that the *Psychology* proposed or needed,—to suppose organs of sense, and these somehow affected, and sensations given, and then to show how a mental operation *distinguishes* the sensation from all others, and *defines* its limits and quantity,—if this were all, then all this is given in the very terms of the question; the *Psychology* is needless, and is but treading in a circle. When it is asked, *Can an intellect be made which shall be able, by sense, to know an outward object?*—organs of sense, sensations,—and sensations which the mind may distinguish as *real, particular, peculiar*,—are all involved in the terms of the inquiry. To know a thing by sense, means—not to know it by a void or



unconscious sensory, or by a "non-sensation",—but by sensation; which of course must be distinct, peculiar and definite. Dr. Hickok, in his long and laborious process, simply gives back what was given in the terms of the inquiry. This is all that Kant accomplished in his famous Categories. Kant labored hard, and supposed he had derived them from *à priori* principles of *knowing*; but the whole twelve were already given in the very conception of a *thing*. They were not derived from principles of *knowing*; they were conditions of the existence, or of the conception, of a *thing*; and would have been the same whether there had been any intellect to know it or not. They aided not in the least to show how *knowledge* may be attained. In like manner, Dr. Hickok proves, from an *à priori* investigation of all possible *intelligence*, as he supposes, that a thing for the sense can never be known save under the conditions of *time* and *space*. His pupil and advocate in the *Princeton Review* (p. 378) thinks it one of the wonderful intuitions of reason, "that matter, wherever it exists, must occupy *space*"; and argues that this knowledge could not have come from experience. Oh! no; it is *given* in the very conception of a material *thing*, or of *matter*. We mean by matter, something extended and solid, filling space. Dr. Hickok's supposition of "substance in its causality", with "no adhering or cohering qualities", and so, independent of time and space, is a contradiction in terms, and simply absurd. It is of matter that is not material; that has the quality of existing nowhere and never. Nor does it relieve him to say that it is *force*; for such force must exist either somewhere and at some time, or nowhere and never; and so must be the "Nothing" which President Edwards said "the sleeping rocks do dream of".

We come now to the Reason. So far, reason has been employed in making these conclusions concerning sense and understanding. But reason itself is not yet found, and is admitted to be perhaps impossible. The unfound and perhaps impossible reason now comes to the harder task of finding herself. If she fails here, all that is gone before goes for

nothing ; and we know not whether understanding, or reason, or sense, or worlds, or anything exists.

Let us observe the process. The unfound reason sees, *à priori*, that if reason is, or ever can be, she must be able to comprehend the universe of nature. Such comprehension, Dr. Hickok tells us, must include, how nature can *begin*, and how it must *end*. But, he declares, a compass for such comprehension can be given only in the Absolute [the transcendental name for God]. The reason therefore sees that its first work is to find the Absolute as an "*à priori* position for the reason". As we yet know no outward facts or worlds, we cannot attempt to know God from the things that are made. Moreover, Dr. Hickok shows at length, that we cannot begin with the things that are made, and come to the knowledge of God ; the argument, from design, and cause, and adaptation to ends, being, in his opinion, wholly unavailing. The *Psychology*, therefore, calls upon us to bid world and sense farewell. "We are thus forced, in this part of our work, to dispense with all use of the understanding, and can see, that if the supernatural can in any manner be attained, it must be in the use of the reason only."—"We make abstraction, then, utterly of all that is phenomenal ; and therefore dispense with all the functions of sense."—"The phenomenal is gone" (p. 401).

What now ? "Let there be the reason—conception of an everywhere present *force*."—"Retain what is most simple"—"the force of *gravity*."—"We shall have in this substance, with its causal laws of attraction, repulsion, inertia, impenetrability, motion by impulse, etc. ; and thus, as it were, the framework or elementary rudiments of a nature of things."—"We have in this all that is necessary for an *à priori* representation of a nature of things in itself" (p. 403). Dr. Hickok also professes to see that light, heat, polarity, electricity, magnetism,—in fine, all the cosmical arrangements of just such a world as ours must necessarily result from such a force of gravity. No wisdom is needed to plan the world ; none can be used. Force necessarily works out just such a world, and no power can hinder it, or make the cosmical arrangements of the world otherwise, if once there is a sufficient antagonistic



force. No God, therefore, had any part in *devising* the cosmical arrangements of the universe. Heat, light, electricity, polarity, the movements of the heavens,—none of these can declare a wise and designing God as their Maker. Only suppose *force*, and no knowledge, or will, or consciousness is needed; and so far the *Psychology* supposes none. It sees that force and antagonism being given, so the worlds *must* be; and that by an “eternal and unmade principle”, which “conditions all power, and is itself conditioned by no power” (p. 71). In his *Rational Cosmology* he declares at the very close (p. 384): “The principle of the generation of the material universe involved the agency of these two forces, and needed none other.” —“Nature needed nothing more for its own existence; nature uses nothing more for its onward development; nature yields nothing more to human solicitation or extortion.”

The only thing now necessary, is to account for the force. Here Dr. Hickok supposes a spirit,—the Absolute,—who simply puts his acts in counter-agency, and takes the necessary results. Dr. Hickok,—or the transcendental reason in Dr. Hickok,—professes to see, that not only just such a world must grow from such a dynamic force; but also that it is the nature of spirit to supply such force and to create matter by putting its acts into counter-agency: and that this is so inseparably the nature of spirit, that the only reason why man cannot create matter and worlds is, that he cannot put the pure acts of his pure spirit into counter-agency, *with nothing between* (*Rational Cosmology*, p. 99). His friend in the *Princeton Review* (July, p. 382) professes to see the same; and adds, that “Matter may thus be the product of spirit, and cognizable by it”; and that thus Dr. Hickok’s scheme “removes the gulf in other systems impassable between the Creator and the creature, between the knowing mind and the material objects of its knowledge”.

That is,—save on Dr. Hickok’s scheme of knowing how God may create matter, viz., by putting his acts into counter-action; and that thus matter is, not what men suppose matter to be, but mere *force*,—it is impossible for man to pass the gulf which lies between him and the knowledge of his Creator!—or to

know that there is such a thing as a material object! If we cannot tell how to create a world, or if a world can be made in any other manner than by the activity of a spirit in counter-agency with itself, then man can neither know a world or God! And spirit can know matter because matter is a product of spirit! The product of *whose* spirit? Can man know all that the spirit of God can produce or create? By the same rule the learned Professor should be able to tell us what man's spirit is in its essence.

But now can Dr. Hickok, or any other man, conceive what it is for a spirit to put his spiritual acts in forceful counter-agency with each other? Is it the activity of intelligence or thought pressing physically against another similar activity? And does this create matter? Is it the essence of the spirit pressing physically against spiritual essence? What are these "acts"? Are they entities distinct from the spirit itself in action? If so, then Dr. Hickok should tell us how to create a spiritual act, and throw it off as a distinct entity, and to put it into that "*push and pull*" with another act, which constitutes "*counter-action, complex action, and reëction*" (*Cosmology*, p. 93), and so creates matter. What is it for these acts to come into counter-action? How does Dr. Hickok know, that so they necessarily "create" an impenetrable substance? Nothing is hazarded in affirming that Dr. Hickok has no conception of any possible meaning in what he affirms. No talk of "Dynamics" or "Mathematics" reaches the case of creating matter by spiritual acts in counter-agency. Man can no more explain how God can create matter, than he can explain how he can create souls. The attempt to do either is wholly irrational.

Spirit is introduced into the scheme; but it is ascertained by no known properties or acts of spirit. No function is allowed to the supposed spirit save that of putting his acts into counter-agency. If will or choice be supposed, he has but one choice and one function of will — whether to put his acts in counter-agency. But neither choice, nor volition, nor wisdom, nor knowledge, nor consciousness is needed; for by the supposition, if the acts come into counter-agency by *chance*, or by



*necessity*, or while the spirit is *unconscious*, then just such a world is produced. Dr. Hickok's creation, therefore, admits no wisdom or design in arranging the cosmical universe. It demands no thought, or will, or consciousness in creating the world. It can fully account for creation, and for all the cosmical arrangements of the universe, by an antagonistic force; and no supposed spirit needs any further capacity than to supply that force; whether by chance, necessity, or by choice, or without thought, or while unconscious, can make no manner of difference. The *Psychology*, therefore, by its own conditions, comes to the simple Absolute of Schelling, who preceded Dr. Hickok in this scheme of world-making. Schelling, in his earlier scheme, needed only a blind, unconscious Absolute striving necessarily and unconsciously after a necessary self-development, and he could tell, *à priori*, how this must produce not only matter and worlds, but thought and reason too: for he professed to see that stones, brains, thought, minerals, and reason are all the same in substance, and necessarily produced by two forces in counter-action; the unity of which forces constitutes the Absolute,—the only, but the unthinking and unconscious God!

Moreover, on Dr. Hickok's scheme, what are the acts of a spirit which come into the supposed counter-action? They can be nothing save the spirit himself in action, forcefully impinging against himself. The Creator himself, in counter-agency with himself, is, on this scheme, himself the world he makes, and so we end in Pantheism. The *Rational Psychology*, as well as the *Rational Cosmology*, must, in this matter, logically and necessarily range itself with the German rationalistic philosophy, with no logical capacity to reach anything at last, save an Ideal world and a Pantheistic God. Let it be distinctly understood, that we speak only of the necessary *logical* results, and of the *logical capacity* of the scheme. Dr. Hickok himself is not a Pantheist; he is opposing Pantheism; but in doing this, he has fallen upon a method, and adopted principles, which can logically lead to no results save Idealism and Pantheism.

Dr. Hickok's friend in the *Princeton Review* supposes that

he saves the scheme from Pantheism by making creation limited, thus :

“But not every spirit, — not the finite can create. They are already limited. Only the Absolute Spirit can make his act react upon itself, and thus produce a force which is truly his creation. And now that our idea of creation involves exactly this process, is clearly seen. For either creation is limited, or it is not. If we take the latter ground, we are both absurd and unchristian ; for this is Pantheism, and we thus identify the Creator and the creature” (p. 382).

This is a new view of Pantheism, viz., that it consists in making creation unlimited ; so that if Dr. Hickok’s supposition of “an everywhere present force” were to be followed by that force “everywhere” in counter-agency, it would make a creation as extensive as the Creator, and so be Pantheism ; while a world made by the same process is distinct from the Creator, and not “unchristian”, if the counter-agency be limited at a point !

Dr. Hickok’s friend continues : “But if we affirm the former position, what is this but declaring that the activity of the Creator restrained itself at the point where creation began, and that this self-imposed restraint is exactly what we mean by creation ?” A very exact definition of the act of creation ! But is it so ? Is there then no world save the “activity of the Creator”—“restraining *itself*”, and putting *itself* under “self-imposed restraint”—at a “point” ? If he restrained himself equally everywhere, it would, on this scheme, make world everywhere, and so make it identical with himself ; and this supposition would be quite unchristian and Pantheistic. Limiting the counter-agency to a point makes a wide difference !

Dr. Hickok’s plan is somewhat differently expressed, thus :

“The Creator must be conceived as — ‘he who ever *is*, and yet never *exists*’ ( *Cosmology*, p. 97). ‘He puts his simple activity in counter-agency. He makes act meet, and hold act — and in this originates an antagonistic force, a *new thing*, a something standing out for objective manifestation.’ — ‘This force fixes itself in position ; holds itself at rest. Its very existence is a *vis inertiae*, or a force actively holding itself still’ ” ( *Cosmology*, p. 101).

According to the *Psychology*, there is no other matter than



this. This constitutes the "very existence" of matter. The "*simple activity*" of the Creator in a state of counter-agency, can be none other than the Creator himself in a state of counteraction. This constitutes "the very existence of the force", which is all the matter and all the world there is!

The reviewer had supposed that God could not be limited to the necessity of creating a world only by putting his acts into counter-agency, and of taking the necessary results; but that he had some choice, and could exercise some wisdom in plans of endless possible variety. Thereupon Professor Lewis charges him with directly holding that "the principles of morality are changeable", and that "if God should command us to hate one another, then malevolence would be right instead of love, deceit would be holy instead of truth". The reviewer, however, had said nothing of the kind, nor any thing touching or involving the principles of morality. His remarks were expressly limited to the "Cosmical arrangements" of the universe. The charge of Professor Lewis was wholly gratuitous, without the slightest foundation of any kind. Dr. Hickok, however, undertakes to vindicate and aggravate the charge, as necessarily involved in the reviewer's principle. He insists that if God has any power of choosing otherwise in making a world, than to put his acts in counter-agency, and take the necessary results; or if it is possible for God to exercise any choice or wisdom, or to vary the plan in forming the cosmical arrangements of the universe, then this "involves the power of contrary choice with a vengeance. Not merely does it involve the doctrine of power to the opposite when the strongest motive in the greatest happiness is applied, but power to the opposite in God, when the claim of principle in his own glory and dignity is applied" (*American Theological Review*, p. 403).

How, from the mere physical principles determining the results of spiritual acts in forceful counter-agency, one can draw such conclusions concerning the field of Will and Morals, is not very apparent. But it is apparent how absolutely, in Dr. Hickok's scheme, the Creator is debarred from all exercise of choice and wisdom, save on the sole question whether to put

his acts in counter-agency. On this scheme the Heavens declare the glory, not of God, but of acts in counter-action. Day unto day uttereth no speech, and night unto night showeth forth no knowledge, of God, but only of the "eternal and unmade principle" that "conditioned" all his power. How abundantly the cropping out of a Pantheistic substratum appears all over this scheme !\*

So far the *Psychology* has told only how the world could *begin*. Now reason comes to tell *à priori* of the world's career, and how it must *end*.

"A race of beings compounded of the material, sentient, and moral", may be created, "and thus that which is personal becomes incarnate — the free subjected to the colliding action of the necessitated" (p. 457).

The "compounding" of the material with the sentient and moral, was an incomprehensible mystery to philosophers in all past time. With all the aids of experience, none could solve that mystery. But Dr. Hickok comprehends the possibility of it *à priori* ! He derives nothing from experience ; he has made abstraction utterly of sense. Why will not Dr. Hickok explain the manner and the *à priori* possibility of such a compound ? Dr. Hickok proceeds :

\* But Dr. Hickok supposes that an *à priori* philosophy can do the same for "animal and vegetable forces", as for worlds. In his *Cosmology* he carries out this idea, and professes to explain what *life* is, and how vegetables and animals are made. Life is "a simple, spiritual activity", which has no "where" nor "when", p. 235. "All unconscious of its wants, and of the adaptations in material forces for its supply and relief, yet will the activity go out spontaneously to its appropriate material forces". "The spiritual activity combines with such material activities as it finds fitted to its wants". "Matter and spirit are in this truly blended, and the life force is no longer merely spiritual activity, and the matter is no longer mere gross mechanism, but this third thing, as a mere substance, is indifferently either life embodied or matter vitalized" (p. 237). "The whole body must be built up as a self-realizing product of the spirit" (p. 238). In plants the spirit builds on the outside. "The first and great peculiarity of the *animal* organism must be, that the *vital force* be transferred altogether from the surface to the inside" (p. 246). "The antagonist and diremptive forces make the material world, and the assimilative forces make the vital world, and the vital in the material builds up its own body *superficially* as the plant"—"also builds up a body about itself from the *inside*, as the animal" (p. 252). And this professes to be *Rational Cosmology* !



"Sin may enter"—"somewhere below the Creator, and from finite personality, inasmuch as no colliding want can reach the Absolute, and sin enter through him".

Is this the reason why God can do no wrong; not because he is holy, but because no "colliding want" can reach him?

"What he may do, he will do to exclude sin, both in the use of sentient nature as a penalty, and, when sin has entered, as a tabernacle for divinity to set forth a propitiation" (p. 458).

Wonderful! Nothing can be a faculty of reason that shall not be able to tell *à priori* that when man has sinned, God "*will make use of sentient nature, as a tabernacle for Divinity to set forth a propitiation*"! Wonderful! The transcendental reason has no Bible for all this! The phenomenal is gone! Reason, if reason ever is or can be, must be able to tell *à priori* of Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement!—mysteries which, from the beginning of the world, have been hid in God. Why should man, with such a faculty of reason, ever need a Bible? Are there any deeper mysteries than these, that should render revelation necessary?

One thing more the reason is required to tell *à priori*, under penalty of never being acknowledged as reason; that is, that the world shall end with a chorus of glory and honor to Him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb (p. 459).

And now, having found the *à priori* idea of reason, we are to proceed and find the reason itself:

"So far, the all-comprehending reason is only a void conception. So it *may* be; so, if at all, it *must* be; but that so it *is*, we have yet to find. Our remaining task is, that we take any facts", etc. — "First, in the physical system."

Facts! In the physical system! We know not yet that there are any. We are to find the reason for the very purpose of learning whether it is possible to know any facts, or any thing physical. But now, alas, reason cannot be found unless we can first find the facts! And facts cannot be found until after the finding of the reason! Here our transcendental car, in which we were soaring into regions beyond all matter,

and before all worlds, suddenly collapses, and Rational Psychology comes to an end.

As well here as anywhere; for before we could find the reason, we were to find, *as a fact*, the ending of the world with a chorus of glory and honor. But this could not be found as a fact till the period comes. The finding of the reason then—even had our transcendental car met with no destructive accident—must have been adjourned till the end of the world. While the world stands, it is, on the principles of the *Rational Psychology*, impossible for man to know anything. And this is the philosophy, so much better adapted than the Bible, to meet the growing skepticism of the age. Dr. Hickok says (*American Theological Review*, p. 409):

“But why go this roundabout with the skeptic through the difficult paths of philosophy? Why not go at once to the highest of all testimony in divine Revelation? We answer, well—best of all; if so be the skeptic will take heaven’s testimony, and be wise by what is written. But in most cases, in all matured cases, the skeptic has shut the Bible as a book of infallible teaching. The man who doubts an Objective world, or a personal God who made and governs it, is not in a state where it is to be expected that he shall read the Bible profitably and believingly. If he should, he would still need the rational teaching, as above, if not for his own sake, at least for many remaining skeptics who will not otherwise follow biblical teaching as he did.”

Alas! will this “rational teaching” persuade those “who will not otherwise follow biblical teaching”? For ourselves, we greatly prefer to approach any man that lives, with “the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God”. The Gospel is still “the power of God unto salvation”. If any will not believe Moses and the prophets, and the Son of God, we have no confidence that they can be reached by any philosophy. But *this* philosophy! We fancy we hear the spirit of skepticism crying out, as did the evil spirit to the exorcists of old: “Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are ye?”



# American Theological Review.

No. XIV.

## CONTENTS OF THE APRIL NUMBER, 1862.

### I. ESSAYS AND REVIEWS.

ARTICLE I.—MODERN PHILOSOPHY PANTHEISTIC. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D.,	199
II.—RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN COLLEGES. By the Rev. D. R. Goodwin, D.D.,	
Provost of the University of Pa.,	228
III.—SWEDENBORG'S THEORY OF THE DIVINE-HUMAN. By Prof. E. A. Lawrence, D.D.,	238
IV.—THE HOMERIC DOCTRINE OF SIN. By Prof. W. S. Tyler, D.D., Amherst,	276
V.—THE PERPETUAL OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. By Prof. Egbert C. Smyth, Bowdoin College,	296
VI.—THE ORIGIN OF IDOLATRY,	328
VII.—PASSAGLIA, GUIZOT, AND DÜLLINGER ON THE ROMAN QUESTION,	352

### II. THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Commodianus in the Spicilegium Solesmense—First printed Bible—Tyndale's Jonas—Traces of Northmen—Simonides' Fac-Simile of Matthew. GREECE: Popular Songs by Passow—New Works—Kalopathakes. GERMANY: Studien und Kritiken—Zwirner—Mozart—Freytag—Theologische Quartalschrift—Ranke on Cromwell—Lasaulx's Works condemned. HOLLAND AND BELGIUM: Jesuit Authors—Van Hengel—Scheffer, etc. SCANDINAVIA: New Works. RUSSIA: University—Periodicals, etc. FRANCE: New Works on Theology—Renan—Vinet—De Gasparin—Revue Chrétienne Annales de Philosophie, etc. ITALY: Conti's Criteria of Philosophy—Basilica of St. Clement—Galileo—Cavour. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL: Spanish Universities—Secret Library of the Inquisition. GREAT BRITAIN: Brit. and Foreign Evang. Review—British Quarterly Review—Journal of Sacred Literature—Timologus on Mansel—Tyler on Jehovah—H. H. Wilson—New Works. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: New Works—Dr. Ruffner—President Felton—Evangelical Review—Brownson's Quarterly,	369
---	-----

### III. LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF BOOKS.

THEOLOGY: Aids to Faith, ed. by Bishop Thomson—Replies to "Essays and Reviews," with Preface by the Bishop of Oxford—Tracts for Priests and People, by various Writers—McCosh, the Supernatural in relation to the Natural—Auberlen, Die göttliche Offenbarung—Stevens's Methodism—J. Few Smith, Presb. Church in Newark. BIBLICAL LITERATURE: Isaac Taylor, Spirit of Hebrew Poetry—Ellicott's Commentary to the Ephesians—Oliver's Syriac Peshito Psalter—Stuart's Commentary on Ecclesiastes. PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS LITERATURE: Osgood and Farley, Christian Worship, Services for the Church, etc.—Schaff, Deutsches Gesangbuch—Schaff, Katechismus—Bonar, Hymns of Faith and Hope—Bonar, God's Way of Peace—Abbott, Practical Christianity. GENERAL LITERATURE: Wedgwood, Dictionary of English Etymology—Permanent Documents of the Society for Collegiate Education—Dana, Ethical and Physiological Inquiries—Bulwer Lytton, A Strange Story—Pilgrims of Fashion. MISCELLANY: Discourses by Prentiss, H. S. Carpenter, and M. M. Smith—President Tappan's Message—R. L. Breck, The Habeas Corpus Act—Mayhew, The Young Benjamin Franklin—John Brown, Health—Five Lay Sermons.	378
--	-----

### IV. STATISTICS, AND CHURCH NEWS.

Prussia—Switzerland—Bulgaria—Algeria—A Secluded Mission Station—Asia—Madagascar—Religious Liberty in Egypt—The Samoan Mission—New South Wales—The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa—The Roman Catholic World—Scotland—Religious Statistics of Austria—Progress of the Gospel in France,	387
---	-----

# American Theological Review.

No. XV.

## CONTENTS OF THE JULY NUMBER, 1862.

### I. ESSAYS AND REVIEWS.

ARTICLE I.—PSYCHOLOGY AND SKEPTICISM. By Laurens Hickok, D.D.,	- - - 391
II.—COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR. By Prof. Francis A. March,	- - - 414
III.—THE ORIGIN OF IDOLATRY; A CRITICISM OF RAWLINSON AND OTHERS,	- 429
IV.—THE TEMPTATION OF CHRIST. By Rev. J. Ambrose Wight,	- - 472
V.—BRITISH SYMPATHY WITH AMERICA,	- - - - - 487
VI.—THE PRESBYTERIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLIES,	- - - - - 553

### II. LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE: Westcott, Introduction to the Gospels—Lange on Matthew—The Family Bible—Sawyer's Translation of the Bible. THEOLOGY: Shedd's Discourses—Dewey's Works—Wolf on Baptism—Bayne's Christ and Christianity—Jones, Trinity. HISTORY OF THE CHURCH: Stanley's Eastern Church—Dorner on the Person of Christ—The Princeton Jubilee—Report on Mahrattas—Laurie on Syria Mission—Krebs' Sermon on Missions. PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS LITERATURE: Bunting's Sermons—Alexander on Faith—Guthrie, Way of Life—Power, The "I Wills" of Christ—Seiss, Parable of Ten Virgins—Life of Vandeleur—Pocket Tracts—Bunnett, Louise Juliane, Electress Palatine—Christ's Work of Reform—Sermons on the Christian Sabbath. POLITICS AND HISTORY: Mill's Representative Government—Botta's Discourse, on Cavour—Enormity of the Slave-Trade—Rice, The Pulpit, etc.—Brownlow, Sketches of Secession—Crummel, Future of Africa—Agénor de Gasparin, L'Amérique devant l'Europe—Principes et Intérêts. BOOKS OF TRAVEL: Burton, City of the Saints—Trollope's North America—Harper's Hand-Book. GENERAL LITERATURE—Müller, Lectures on Language—Religio Medici—De Quincey—De Tocqueville, etc.

572

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N.B.—Other notices of Books, and all the *Theological and Literary Intelligence*, and *News of the Churches* prepared for this number, are necessarily deferred.